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The Proper Standard For Directors' Negligence
Liability
Larry D. Soderquist
I. INTRODUCTION
For half a century, the law on directors' negligence liability
.has been in a muddle. The problem began when a New York trial
court wrongly decided Litwin v. Allen,' the long-time leading case
holding directors liable for negligent management,2 without a
jurisprudential underpinning and without an understanding of just
what was behind the directors' conduct. Difficulties continued
when succeeding cases failed either to correct the problems inher-
ent in Litwin or even to provide directors with guidance on how
to protect themselves from liability.' The last major directors'
liability case, Smith v. Van Gorkom,4 so scared directors and their
insurers5 that the Delaware legislature, followed to date by the
legislatures of almost two-thirds of the other states, passed a stat-
ute allowing corporations to eliminate directors' liability for negli-
gence, with the sole proviso that directors must act in good
faith.6 It will be the job of courts to add content to these new
laws by determining what "good faith" means in this context.
Furthermore, it will be up to legislatures that have not yet fol-
lowed Delaware's lead to decide if they are going to do so.
What courts and legislatures need now is what they have
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. B.S., 1966, Eastern Michigan University;
J.D., 1969, Harvard University. I am grateful to Lynne Townsend Albert and Michael J.
Russell for their helpful assistance.
1 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1940).
2 One indication of Litwin's influence has been its extensive use in corporation law
casebooks. See, e.g., W: CARY, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 514 (4th ed. 1969);
J. DEUTSCH & J. BIANCO, LAW OF CORPORATIONS: WHAT CORPORATE LAWYERS Do 481
(1976); H. HENN, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 419 (1974); R. HAMILTON,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 683 (4th ed. 1990); R. JENNINGS & R.
BUXBAUM, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 177 (5th ed. 1979) (Litwin referred to
as "the leading case"); L SODERQUIST & A. SOMMER, CORPORATIONS: A PROBLEM AP-
PROACH 199 (2d ed. 1986); D. VAGTS, BASIC CORPORATION LAW 227 (2d ed. 1979).
3 See, e.g., Soderquist, Toward a Mom Effective Corporate Board: Reexamining Roles of
Outside Diredoss 52 N.Y.U. L REV. 1341, 1342-50 (1977).
4 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
5 See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
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needed all along but have not had: theoretical and experiential
bases for determining the liability of directors for negligence.
After examining judicial and legislative developments that have
brought us to the present state, this Article win postulate such
bases and then evaluate the Delaware approach in light of these
bases.
II. WHAT COURTS HAVE TOLD DIRECTORS ABOUT NEGLIGENCE
Litwin v. Allen is the first modern case in which a court held
directors liable simply for negligent management.7 This, by itself,
gave the case major importance. That it involved famous and
prestigious banking houses, and unusual facts, helped insure
Litwin's place in history. To set the stage for further analysis, it is
necessary to tell the story of Litwin.
It all began in early 1929, just before the start of the Great
Depression, when clients of J. P. Morgan & Co. organized
Alleghany Corporation to invest in railroad securities.' By Octo-
ber of the next year the depression was one year old, and
Alleghany needed $10 million to pay for railroad terminals in
Kansas City and St. Joseph, Missouri. Because of a borrowing
limitation in its charter, a loan was not possible,9 but Morgan
came to the rescue by agreeing to transactions designed to substi-
tute for a loan.'" What Morgan did was purchase from
Alleghany $10 million face amount of debentures issued by
Alleghany's subsidiary, Missouri Pacific Railroad. Because the de-
bentures were convertible into Missouri Pacific common stock,
and because Alleghany did not want this stock to fall into the
hands of outsiders, Alleghany retained the option to repurchase
the debentures, at the price paid by Morgan, within six
months." Since Morgan would receive the interest accrued on
the debentures during the time it owned them, the sale and re-
purchase would have essentially the financial attributes of a loan,
but without violating Alleghany's charter.
The road to Litwin v. Allen began when Morgan sold a $3
million participation in the transactions to its affiliate, Guaranty
7 There are, of course, earlier cases that provide insight on the subject. See, e.g.,
Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524 (1920); Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924);
Hun v. Gary, 82 N.Y. 65 (1880).
8 25 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
9 Id. at 691.
10 I. at 696.
11 I. at 692.
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Trust Company of New York, 2 upon the approval of the Trust
Company's directors." Next, of course, the depression deepened,
the market value of the Missouri Pacific debentures fell precipi-
tously, and Alleghany never exercised its option.' 4 Trust Compa-
ny shareholders then sued the directors for negligence in approv-
ing the Trust Company's participation in the Alleghany transac-
tions. The court's discussion of what it called "the rules to be
applied in determining the liability of directors" 5 was brief: "di-
rectors are liable for negligence in the performance of their du-
ties ... . In the last analysis, whether or not a director ... . has
been negligent, depends on the facts and circumstances of a par-
ticular case . . . A director is called upon 'to bestow the care
and skill' which the situation demands." 6
Turning to the Alleghany situation, the court found that the
"directors plainly failed . . . to bestow the care which the situation
demanded." 7 The judge said, "I find liability in this transaction
because the entire arrangement was so improvident, so risky, so
unusual and unnecessary as to be contrary to fundamental con-
ceptions of prudent banking practice."" Then the court asked
an intriguing question: "What sound reason is there for a
bank ... to buy securities under an arrangement whereby any
appreciation will inure to the benefit of the seller and any loss
will be borne by the bank?"' 9 Plainly, there was no sound reason
for the directors to have approved, the arrangement. The defects
were dear in hindsight, and the arrangement cost the Trust Com-
pany $1,000,000.20 Why, then did the directors approve it? An
examination of this question and its importance is included in
Part IV of this Article, which discusses proposed bases for
directors' negligence liability.
Although Litwin clearly established a precedent for holding
directors liable for negligence, few cases were decided against
them after Litwin." Directors soon fell into a state of comfort-
12 Id. at 693.
13 Id. at 702.
14 Id. at 695.
15 I& at 677.
16 Id. at 678 (quoting New York Cent. R.R. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, 382-83
(1873)).
17 Id. at 699.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1940, at 39, col. 4.
21 Joseph Bishop commented in 1968: "The hard fact is that cases in which direc-
1990]
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able complacency. As the British life peer, Lord Boothby, put it:
If you have five directorships it is total heaven, like having a
permanent hot bath .... No effort of any kind is called for.
You go to a meeting once a month in a car supplied by the
company, you look grave and sage, on two occasions say, "I
agree," say "I don't think so" once, and if all goes well you get
500 pounds a year."
This continued until the late 1960s. The turning point was the
decision in Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.,23 a case under
section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 4 in which directors
where held liable for defects in their corporation's registration
statement.25 After BarChris, Boothby's "hot bath" took on new
meaning for directors as they became more and more concerned
about what courts expected of them and what they could do to
protect themselves from negligence claims.
Although BarChris served to raise the consciousness of direc-
tors, it did not provide any guidance about what is or is not neg-
ligence for directors, because it involved the application of a nar-
row statutory criterion of behavior26 rather than a general negli-
gence standard. The major directors' negligence cases of the
1970s and early 1980s, Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes National Training
School for Deaconesses and Missionaries27 and Francis v. United Jersey
Bank,28 did provide helpful general guidance by emphasizing the
directors' monitoring or supervisory role within the corpora-
tion.2 '9 But neither case provided a meaningful analysis of
tors of business corporations are held liable, at the suit of stockholders, for mere negli-
gence are few and far between." Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the
Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE LJ. 1078, 1095 (1968).
22 Chamberlain, Why it's Harder and Harder to Get a Good Board; FORTUNE, Nov.
1962, at 109.
23 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
24 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988).
25 Writing in the early 1970s, with the benefit of the right amount of hindsight,
Robert Estes indicated that BarChris "is credited with marking a, new era in the law
governing director liabilities." Estes, Outside Directors: More Vulnerable than Ever, HARV.
Bus. REv. 109 (Jan.-Feb. 1973).
26 The criterion is one of "reasonable investigation" before a director can take
advantage of the general "due diligence" defense provided by section 11(b) of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1988).
27 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974).
28 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981).
29 See e.g., Lucy Webb Hayes, 381 F. Supp. at 1014 ("A director whose failure to
supervise permits negligent mismanagement by others to go unchecked has committed
an independent wrong against the corporation"); Francis, 87 N.J. at 32, 432 A.2d at 822
("Directorial management does not require a detailed inspection of day-to-day activities,
[Vol. 66:37
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directors' conduct against a negligence standard because the direc-.
tors either did nothing, as in the case of Francis," or next to
nothing relevant to the facts at hand, as in Lucy Webb Hayes."
Smith v. Van Gorkom"2 is the most important directors' liabili-
ty case since Litwin."3 Like Litwin, it involved alleged mismanage-
ment by directors in connection with their approval of a pro-
posed corporate transaction. The transaction was a merger in
which the shareholders of Trans Union Corporation would receive
$55 per share 4 The merger had been negotiated by the chief
executive officer of Trans Union without the knowledge of the
board, and was approved at a board meeting after two hours of
consideration. 5 Without any substantial discussion of the
standard against which the directors' conduct was to be judged,"
the Delaware Supreme Court determined that the directors had
failed adequately to inform themselves about various matters,
including the intrinsic value of the corporation.37 The court stat-
ed that the directors were, at a minimum, grossly negligent in
approving the merger.3 " As a result, the court held the directors
liable for the difference between what the shareholders received
in the merger and the fair value of the corporation, which value
was to be determined at an evidentiary hearing.39 At this point,
but rather a general monitoring of corporate affairs and policies.").
30 "[The defendant-director] did not pay any attention to her duties as a director or
to the affairs of the corporation." 87 N.J. at 27, 432 A.2d at 819.
31 "In short, these [directors] have . . . failed to exercise even the most cursory
supervision over the handling of Hospital funds and failed to establish and carry out a
defined policy." 381 F. Supp. at 1016.
32 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
33 As an example of Van Gorkom's influence, it appears that all or virtually all
corporation law casebooks published since Van Gorkom have included this case. See W.
CARY & M. EISENBERO, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 519 (6th ed. Supp. 1988);
J. CHOPER, J. COFFEE & C. MORRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 247 (3d
ed. 1989); A. CONARD, R. KNAUSS & S. SIEGEL, ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATION 692 (4th ed.
1987); H. HENN, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 401 (2d ed. 1986); R. HAMIL,-
TON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 704 (4th ed. 1990); L SODERQUIST & A.
SOMMER, CORPORATIONS: A PROBLEM APPROACH 215 (2d ed. 1986); L SOLOMON, D.
SCHWARTZ & J. BAUMAN, CORPORATIONS: LAW AND POLICY 623 (2d ed. 1989); D. VAGTS,
BASIC CORPORATION LAw 212 (3d ed. 1989).
34 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 867.
35 Id. at 865-69.
36 See id. at 872-73.
37 Id. at 874.
38 Id
39 Id. at 893. The directors pleaded the business judgment rule, which in Delaware
protects directors by establishing "a presumption that in making a business decision, the
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company." IeL at 872 (quot-
1990]
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the plaintiffs' lawyers were projecting damages of up to $200
million, with the directors having only an estimated $20 million in
liability insurance.4" Ultimately, the case was settled for $23.5
million,4 without an evidentiary hearing having been held. But
$23.5 million was sufficient to keep the fears of directors from
abating.
The president of the National Association of Corporate Direc-
tors has said that Van Gorkom "created perilous times for corpo-
rate directors,"4 2 and has called the decision "the straw that
broke the camel's back" as far as directors are concerned.43
Clearly the case had the direct effect of frightening directors. In
an article discussing the fallout of the decision, for example, a
business school dean who is a director of eight corporations was
quoted as saying: "I would probably resign from every board on
which I serve if I am liable beyond my directors' and officers'
insurance."44 Regrettably, for this and other directors, Van
Gorkom also had the indirect effect of making directors' liability
insurance harder to get and substantially more expensive.45 By
mid-1986, a directorship was in danger of becoming what one
business writer called "a job that nobody wants."46
ing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. Super. Ct. 1984)). Here the rule did not
protect the directors because, in the view of the court, the rule offers "no protection to
directors who have made 'an unintelligent or unadvised judgment,'" id. at 872 (quoting
Mitchell v. Highland-Western Glass, 167 A. 831, 833 (Del. Ch. 1933)), and because in
Delaware a finding of gross negligence answers in the negative the question of whether
a decision is an informed one. Id. at 873.
40 Glaberson & Powell, A Landmark Ruling that Puts Board Members in Perit Bus.
WK., Mar. 18, 1985, at 56, 57.
41 Mauro, Liability in the Boardroom, NATioN's Bus., May 1986, at 46.
42 Glaberson & Powell, supra note 40, at 56.
43 Mauro, supra note 41, at 45-46.
44 Presumably meaning he would resign if his personal wealth were greater than the
policy limits. Glaberson & Powell, supra note 40, at 57. See also, e.g., Mauro, supra note
41, at 46.
45 Shortly after Van Gorkom, a manager of the leading directors' liability insurer,
Lloyd's of London, said, "Any buyer who thinks the cost of his insurance will only
double is a dreamer." Newport, Protecting Directors Suddenly Gets Costly, FORTUNE, Mar. 18,
1985, at 61. Two years after Van Gorkom, Korn/Ferry International estimated that the
premiums for directors' liability insurance "went up more than 900 percent in just two
years." Powell, Is It Safe to Go Back in the Boardroom?, NEWSWEEK, May 4, 1987, at 45,
46.
46 Baum, The Job Nobody Wants, Bus. WK. Sept. 8, 1986 at 56.
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M. RESPONSE OF STATE LEGISLATURES
In June of 1986 the Delaware legislature stepped in. Its re-
sponse to what some were now calling a "crisis, " 47 was this
amendment to the Delaware General Corporation Law: "IT]he
certificate of incorporation may... contain... [a] provision
eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the
corporation for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as
a director [except]* for acts or omissions not in good faith...
.4s Delaware corporations rushed to amend their certificates of
incorporation, and a sizable number of out-of-state corporations
reincorporated in Delaware to take advantage of the new provi-
sion.4" In a characteristic phenomenon well described by William
L. Cary,50 other states quickly began adopting copies or near
copies of the Delaware amendment. Almost two-thirds of the
states have now done so.-"
Legislatures in the remaining states now must decide if they
also are going to follow Delaware's lead. In those states that have
adopted one of the new provisions, it will be the job of the
courts to interpret them. At the same time, it will continue to be
47 See, e.g., Powell, supra note 45, at 46.
48 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1988). The "except" clause also
included acts and omissions constituting the unlawful declaration of dividends, intention-
al misconduct, a knowing violation of law or a breach of the director's duty of loyalty.
These are derelictions generally involving something other than ordinary negligence, and
they have not been involved in the directors' liability "crisis."
49 See, eg., Powell, supra note 45, at 45.
50 Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE UJ. 663,
665-66 (1974).
51 ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.210 (1989); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-054 (1990); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 4-27-202 (1990); CAL. CORP. CODE § 204 (West Supp. 1990); GA. CODE
ANN. § 14-2-202 (1989); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-3-101 (West 1990); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 415-48.5 (Michie Supp. 1990); IDAHO CODE § 01-54 (Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 491.5 (West Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6002 (1988); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 271A.271 (Baldwin 1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:24 (West Supp. 1990); MD.
CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. ch. 546 § 2-405.2 (1990); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 156B
§ 13 (Law. Co-op. 1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1209 (West 1990); MINN. STAT.
§ 300.64 (1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-202 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78.037
(Michie Supp. 1989); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:54 (Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
14A: 2-7 (West Supp. 1990); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 402 (McKinney Supp. 1990); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-2-02 (1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 1006 (West Supp. 1990); ORE.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.047 (Butterworth Supp. 1990); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8364
(Purdon Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWs § 7-1.1-48 (Supp. 1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 47-2-58.8 (Supp. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-12-102 (1988); TEE. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. § 1302-7.06 (Vernon Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-49.1 (Supp. 1990);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.12.020 (Supp. 1990); WYO. STAT. § 17-16-834 (1989).
1990]
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the task of courts to render decisions about directors' negligence
liability without reference to one of these provisions.52 In each
of these situations, it would be helpful for the legislature or court
to have available theoretical and experiential bases for directors'
negligence liability when exercising the judgments required of
them.
IV. THEORETICAL AND EXPERIENTIAL BASES FOR DIRECTORS'
NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY
The proper bases for making judgments about directors' neg-
ligence liability need to be both theoretical and experiential. This
is shorthand for saying that in making these judgments, courts
and legislatures should have in mind just what they are trying to
accomplish (the theoretical base), and should also have some
sound means of evaluating whether a particular decision is likely
to help or hinder what they are trying to accomplish (the experi-
ential base).
A. Theoretical Base
Directors should be held liable for arguably negligent conduct
when doing so satisfies some desired end. It is a thesis of this
Article that there are three such ends. First, an arguably negligent
director should be held liable when that director is blameworthy
and when a finding of liability will help channel the future behav-
ior of directors in a desired way. This might involve deterrence,
but more often it would involve pushing directors toward particu-
lar conduct rather than merely attempting to dissuade them from
repeating a defendant-director's past actions. For example, the
decision in Van Gorkom can be read as encouraging directors to
hire investment bankers to value their corporation before approv-
ing its sale.5"
The second desired end in holding an arguably negligent
director liable is recompensing the corporation or its sharehold-
ers, or some other appropriate client-group,54 for an injury at-
52 Some of these courts will sit in states still using only a common law formulation
for determining directors' liability, and others will decide cases involving directors of
corporations that do not specify the good faith standard in their corporate charter.
53 Dicta, of course, is a typical way that courts effect this positive channeling. But
often, as in the Van Gorkom situation, the inclusion of channeling dicta is not necessary.
54 For a discussion of directors' responsibility to groups other than the sharehold-
ers, see Soderquist & Vecchio, Reconciling Shareholder Rights and Corporate Responsibility:
New Guidelines for Management, 1978 DuKE LJ. 819.
[Vol. 66:37
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tributable to conduct for which the director is blameworthy. The
important focus here is on blameworthiness. Before deciding that
recompense from a director is appropriate, it is important to
determine if there was an injury to someone 'having a claim on
the director, and if the injury is attributable to the director. Deci-
sions on these matters are typical of everyday decisionmaking by
judges. Determining blameworthiness of directors, however, is a
more specialized and difficult matter. This will be discussed fur-
ther below.
The third desired end in holding liable an arguably negligent
director is to punish the director for blameworthy conduct. Some
might argue that punishment is an inappropriate goal for a theory
of negligence liability. Certainly criminal law holds society's main
store of retribution. But punitive damages are well established in
tort law. Also, punishment, in terms of a money judgment and its
attendant blight on reputation, seems appropriate for a director
who has taken a large stipend from the corporation55 while in a
prestigious position,56 but who by engaging in blameworthy con-
duct has failed to keep faith with the corporation.
Finally, to these ends a caveat must be added: The applica-
tion of judicial decisionmaking in their pursuit must not be so
rigorous as to deter a sufficient number of qualified candidates
from serving as directors, nor to make the costs involved in at-
tracting such candidates unreasonably high. 7
B. Experiential Base
Two critical questions arise from the above discussion and
need to be answered before decisions can be made about whether
a director should be held liable for arguably negligent conduct.
First, "Is the director blameworthy?" and second, "Will holding
the director liable help channel the future behavior of directors in
a desired way?" Courts tend to answer such questions by refer-
ence to their own intuition. This can have unfortunate conse-
quences, because in matters such as those involved here, intuition
often is not a reliable guide. Litwin v. Allen provides a good ex-
ample.
55 See, e.g., Baum, 'Professional" Direcors: So Many Board So Little Time, Bus. WL
Sept 8, 1986, at 59. But see Dunn, Directors Aren't Doing Their Jobs, FORTUNE, Mar. 16,
1987, at 117.
56 Eg., The Art of Landing-a Boardroom Seat, Bus. WY., Dec. 22, 1986, at 71.
57 The costs mainly would involve the promised direct and indirect compensation
and payment for the corporation's officers' and directors' liability insurance.
1990]
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As indicated above,5" the interesting question about Litwin is
why the directors of the Trust Company approved an arrange-
ment whereby any appreciation in the value of the Missouri Pacif-
ic debentures it purchased from Alleghany would inure to the
benefit of Alleghany and any loss would by borne by the Trust
Company. One writer has suggested that "the answer lay in the
complex interdependencies of high finance in those troubled
times."59 The problem with this theory is that the finance in-
volved was very basic. As any first year business school student
can appreciate, with Alleghany having a call," the Trust Compa-
ny needed a put.6' This is so obvious that, if the Trust Company
had requested a put, Alleghany could not have refused.
The question then is, why did the directors not demand a
put? Two obvious possibilities come to mind: incompetence and
double-dealing. But it is almost inconceivable that directors of a
major bank were in over their heads at so basic a level of finance,
and the court took pains to dispel any suspicions of dishonesty. 2
Further, contemporary newspaper accounts hint at neither incom-
petence nor dishonesty." The most likely remaining possibility is
that the directors did not "see" the defect in the Alleghany ar-
rangements when the arrangements were presented to them for
approval. That is, the directors heard a description of the ar-
rangements and an explanation of what the arrangements were
designed to accomplish,64 determined that the arrangements
made good business sense in the context presented, and approved
the arrangements without it having crossed their minds that the
arrangements contained a monumental defect.
If the directors did not "see" the defect, it is probable that
some phenomenon of human behavior was behind this failure. If
this is the case, an understanding of this phenomenon would be
helpful in making decisions both about blameworthiness and
about how to channel directors' conduct. The literature of psycho-
58 See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
59 Dyson, The Dirvctor's Liability for Negligence, 40 IND. L.J. 341, 370 (1965).
60 A "call" is a right to buy securities on terms agreed to in advance.
61 A "put" is a right to sell securities on terms agreed to in advance.
62 Litwin, 25 N.Y.S.2d at 699 ("[The honesty of the directors in this case is unques-
tioned.").
63 See, N.Y. Times, May 21, 1940, at 39, col. 6; May 28, 1940, at 35, col. 8; Dec.
19, 1940, at 39, col.4.
64 Actually, some directors heard the description and explanation twice, because the
arrangements were approved first at a meeting of the executive committee and later at a
meeting of the full board. Litwin, 25 N.Y.S.2d at 702.
[Vol. 66:37
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logical experimentation suggests two possibilities. One is the phe-
nomenon of set, the other a phenomenon called functional fixed-
ness.
In the context of problem solving, "set" means a "tenden-
cy... to respond to subsequent stimuli on the basis of preceding
stimuli."65 This tendency may manifest itself as behavioral rigid-
ity, which is "a lack of shift in behavior when the situation calls
for a shift.""6 The classic experiments are Luchins' water jar
problems." In these experiments, Luchins presented to subjects
a series of problems along these lines: "Given: an empty 21-quart
jar, an empty 127-quart jar, and an empty 3-quart jar; measure
100 quarts of water."" If the jars are referred to in order as A,
B and C, the solution may be expressed as the formula B minus
A minus 2C. After giving subjects a series of problems solvable
only using this formula, Luchins introduced another series.69 All
of the problems in this series, except one, could be solved this
same way, but they could also. be solved by a direct and simple
formula, such as A minus C. One problem in this series could be
solved only by the A minus C formula. 7 Finally, Luchins gave to
a control group only the second series of problems, skipping the
earlier series. The object of the experiments was to determine if
the first series of problems induced mental set in the subjects,
which Luchins called "Einstellung."7 This would be indicated by
the subjects solving problems in the second series of problems by
the round-about means learned in solving the first series, and by
the inability of the subjects to solve the one problem that could
65 Kearsley, Problem-Solving Set and Functional Fixedness: A Contextual Hypothesis, 16
CAN. PSYCHOLOGICAL REv. 261, 262 (1975).
66 Luchins, The Einstellung Test of Rigidity: Its Relation to Concreteness of Thinking, 15
J. CONSULTING PSYCHOLOGY 303, 308 (1951).
67 For the earliest and most comprehensive report of these experiments, see
Luchins, Mechanization in Problem-Solving, 54 PSYCHOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS No. 6 (1942).
For a more concise exposition, see Luchins, On the Recent Usage of the EinstelluntEffect as
a Test of Rigidity, 15 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOLOGY 89 (1951).
68 Luchins, On the Recent Usage of the Einstellun-Effed as a Test of Rigidity, supra
note 67, at 89.
69 There was no break point by which subjects could identify the end of the first
series and the beginning of the second.
70 Some subjects were simply given the problems and told to solve them. Others
were told to write on their papers, just before the second series of problems, "Don't be
blind."
71 Luchins indicated that Einstellung is "the set which immediately predisposes an
organism to one type of motor or conscious act." Luchins, Mechanization in Problem.
Solving, supra note 67, at 3 n.4 (citing H. WARREN, DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY 371
(1934)).
1990i
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only be solved by using the direct and simple formula.
Luchins reported that "[1]arge Einstellung effects were ob-
tained in all experimental groups, whether they were composed of
element~ry school children, high school children, college students,
adults with no formal education, or college professors."7 2 For
example, in six groups of college students, from 70 to 100 per-
cent of the subjects exhibited the set phenomenon.7 s Perhaps
most interesting were the results achieved by these groups on the
one question that could be solved only by application of the di-
rect and simple formula. In the best performing of these groups,
27 percent of the subjects could not solve this problem in the
allotted two-and-one-half minutes. In the other five of these
groups, from 50 to 70 percent of the subjects failed to solve this
problem.74 No subject in a college student control group (to
whom only the second series of problems was presented) failed to
solve any of the problems, including the problem that could be
solved only by the direct and simple formula, and for each prob-
lem all of these control subjects used the direct and simple for-
mula rather than the roundabout one. 5 Typical responses of
non-control subjects after being shown the direct and simple for-
mula were: "How dumb I was," "How stupid of me," "How blind
I was." 76
The second phenomenon to be examined, functional fixed-
ness, is the phenomenon that "[k]nowledge of the usual use or
function of an object leads to a 'fixation' of that object to a spe-
cific purpose."77 Of the classic experiments on functional fixed-
ness, the most famous is Duncker's box problem.7 1 In this prob-
lem Duncker led a subject to a table on which he had' placed,
among some extraneous objects, three small boxes, along with
some matches, tacks and candles. In one variation of the experi-
72 Luchins, On Recent Usage of the Einstellung Effect as a Test of Rigidity, supra note
67, at 90. Luchins found no statistically significant variation among the subjects he
grouped by I.Q. Luchins, Mechanization in Problem-Solving, supra note 67, at 19.
73 Luchins, Mechanization in Problem.Solving, supra note 67, at 6. Groups of subjects
who received the "Don't be blind" warning, see supra note 70, solved the immediately
following problems by application of the direct and simple formula from 7% to 50%
more frequently than did those who had not received the warning. Luchins, Mechaniza-
tion in Problem-Solving, supra, note 67, at 7.
74 Id. at 14-15.
75 Id. at 6-7, 15.
76 Id. at 2.
77 Kearsley, supra note 65, at 263.
78 See Duncker, On Problem-Solving, 58 PSYCHOLOGY MONOGRAPH No. 5 at 85-88
(1945).
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ment, the matches, tacks and candles were in the three boxes, in
the other variation the boxes were empty. Duncker told the sub-
ject that his task was to find a way to Place three candles on the
door, at the height of the eyes. When the boxes were presented
empty, 100 percent of the subjects solved the problem by attach-
ing a box to the door with tacks and using the box as a platform
for the candles. When the boxes were filled with the other ob-
jects, only 42.9 percent of the subjects solved the problem. 9 The
rest of the subjects seemed to fixate on the use of the boxes as
containers. As in the case of the water jar experiments, a phe-
nomenon of human behavior prevented subjects from "seeing"
what in other circumstances was an obvious solution to a relative-
ly simple problem.
Set and functional fixedness are so similar that psychologists
generally believe that they are variations of the same basic phe-
nomenon."0 If it is correct that the Trust Company directors in
Litwin approved the Alleghany transactions because they did not
"see" the latent defect in these transactions, it seems probable
that this failure to "see" arose as a result of the basic behavioral
phenomenon of which set and functional fixedness are apparently
variants." Specifically, the directors may have had a mental pre-
disposition toward viewing the Alleghany transactions merely as a
creative substitute for a loan, and thus failed to perceive the de-
fect that is so apparent when the terms of the transactions are
viewed in a straightforward financial context. Alternatively, the
directors may have fixated on the role of the debentures as tools
by which Alleghany could maintain control of Missouri Pacific,
and thus failed to consider that no contract existed under which
the debentures must be repurchased. One can visualize the Trust
Company directors saying, with a self-inflicted slap to the fore-
head, the same things as Luchins' subjects: "How dumb I was,"
"How stupid of me," "How blind I was."
If these suppositions are correct, were the Trust Company
directors blameworthy? Or, put another way, was it fair to take
79 Id. at 86, 88.
80 Kearsley, supra note 65, at 261. See also, Flavell, Cooper & Loiselle, Effect of the
Number of Pre-Utilization Functions on Functional Fixedness in Problem Solving, 4 PSYCHOLO-
GY REP. 343, 343 (1958).
81 A search of the psychological literature failed to disclose another phenomenon
likely to explain the directors' - behavior. If some phenomenon of human behavior was
behind the directors' failure to "see" the latent defect, it is unlikely that the phenome-
non is one that has escaped the notice of experimental psychologists.
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money out of their pockets and give it to the Trust Company?
And was it fair to take the directors' reputations in the process?
The directors were not blameworthy if their behavior arose as a
consequence of blindness induced by normal mental processes
they did not control, rather than from a lack of interest or effort.
The reputation of the directors should not have been damaged by
such conduct, and the corporation rather than the directors
should have borne the financial consequences of the directors'
acts. Directors should not be held liable for failing to conform
their conduct to a standard established without reference to the
realities of human behavior.
Blameworthiness, however, is only one of the postulated crite-
ria for holding liable an arguably negligent director. The other
criterion is whether holding the director liable will help channel
the future behavior of directors in a desired way. Again focusing
on the Litwin situation as a paradigm, the literature of psychologi-
cal experimentation will help answer whether this criterion was
met in that case. If it was, any beneficial channeling of behavior
presumably came about because of the directors' concern that
they might be held liable if their performance did not meet a
court's expectations. In psychological terms, a product of this
concern was stress. This being the case, it is necessary to deter-
mine the likely effect of stress on directors' performance.
Studies on the effects of stress on various tasks have tended
to classify the tasks as relating either to verbal or perceptual-mo-
tor performance.8 2 In each area of performance, experimental
studies long ago have shown deleterious effects resulting from
psychological stress. In the verbal area, for example, fifty-year-old
research showed that stress causes a decrease in both rate of
learning 3 and in recall.8 4 In the area of perceptual-motor per-
formance, experiments now four decades old showed such effects
as increased rigidity and non-adaptive behavior.8 " For present
purposes, the most interesting study is one involving psychological
stress applied to subjects solving Luchins' water jar problems."6
82 Lazarus, Deese & Osler, The Effects of Psychological Stress Upon Peformance, 49
PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 293, 301 (1952).
83 Thorndike & Woodyard, The Influence of the Relative Frequency of Successes and
Frustrations Upon Intellectual Achievement, 25 J. EDUC. PSYCHOLOGY 241, 249-50 (1934).
84 Zeller, An Experimental Analogue of Repression: II. The Effect of Individual Failure
and Success on Memory Measured by Relearning, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 411
(1950).
85 Marquart, The Pattern of Punishment and its Relation to Abnormal Fixation in Hu-
man Subjects, 39 J. GEN. PSYCHOLOGY 107 (1948).
86 Cowen, The Influence of Vaying Degrees of Psychological Stress on Problem-Solving
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Here the experimenter separated his subjects into three groups: a
control group to which he gave the problems without stress, a
mildly stressed group"7 and a strongly stressed group.8 The
number of roundabout rather than direct and simple solutions to
the problems doubled between the control and mildly stressed
groups and doubled again for the strongly stressed group,8 9 indi-
cating "that problem-solving rigidity increases under increasing
degrees of psychological stress."9"
Considering the negative effects of stress, it is unlikely that
Litwin has helped channel other directors' problem solving behav-
ior in desirable ways. To the contrary, any effect on other direc-
tors in this respect probably has been deleterious. Fear of liability
engendered by Litwin may have prompted directors to attend
meetings more regularly, read corporate reports with greater care,
or pay more attention to other duties. But, even if so, this effect
came at the cost of holding non-blameworthy directors liable.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Directors are not supposed to be insurers of the wisdom of
their decisions.91 Nevertheless, this is what too easily happens
when, as in Litwin, the focus of a court's inquiry is the substance
of a director's decision. The intuition of courts about blamewor-
thiness, and about the channeling of future conduct, is not a
reliable guide when this is a court's focus. For a court to draw
rational conclusions based on the substance of decisions, it would
have to base its decision on scientific evidence rather than on its
Rigidity, 47 J. ABNORMAL Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 512 (1952).
87 Near the beginning of the water jar problems, the experimenter introduced a
new problem designed to induce mild stress. The problem was an intriguing mental puz-
zle that, while engaging the subjects' interest, was not solvable as a practical matter. Id.
at 513.
88 The experimenter induced strong stress iainly in this way First, he had all
subjects take a psychological test, telling them that the results of the test would be
reviewed by a board of clinicians and that those "whose records were questionable
would probably be called back for additional testing." Some days later the experimenter
told a quarter of the group, chosen at random, that their tests "had pointed to the
presence of certain maladaptive personality features, and that the purpose of the testing
about to take place was to provide further data to test the accuracy of the diagnostic
formulation." The experimenter then gave the subjects the water jar problems. (In a
debriefing at the end of the experiment, the experimenter told the subjects about the
random nature of their selection.) Id. at 513-14.
89 Id. at 515 (table 2).
90 Id. at 518.
91 See, e.g., Litwin, 25 N.Y.S.2d at 678; Selheimer v. Manganese Corp., 423 Pa. 563,
581, 224 A.2d 634, 644 (1966).
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own intuition. This is not a happy prospect, for the science in-
volved is inexact, and its proof would turn on the conflicting
testimony of experts. Among other problems, directors could not
predict with any accuracy what conduct might later be considered
negligent. The alternative is for courts to focus only on the pro-
cess of decisionmaking when determining the question of a
director's negligence. Refinements will be discussed below,92 but
basically the best question to ask would be: Did the director try
to do an adequate job? This is an inquiry that is both directed
precisely at blameworthiness and is well suited to judicial
decisionmaking.9
3
Considering the recent statutory amendments on the question
of directors' liability,94 it is important to determine whether
these amendments establish the proper standard for liability. If
they do, legislatures that have not yet adopted such an amend-
ment should do so, and courts should adopt the standard estab-
lished by these amendments when the choice of standard is
theirs. These amendments allow a corporation to eliminate the
liability of a director for breach of fiduciary duty, insofar as negli-
gence liability is concerned, except for acts or omissions that were
not in good faith.95
In evaluating this standard, it is necessary to determine what
"good faith" means in this context. "Good faith" is used in a wide
variety of legal contexts, and it means different things in different
contexts, with large cross-contextual variations.96 Certainly the
term always includes something like "pureheartedness." Just as
certainly it means more than simply this in the context of the
directors' negligence standard. In determining the meaning of
"good faith" in this context, it will be helpful first to focus on the
fact that corporation statutes give a number of responsibilities to
92 See infra text preceding note 100.
93 As was apparent in the Van Gorhom situation, the business judgment rule has
been only a half-way measure in protecting directors against the unreasonable imposition
of liability based on the substance of their decisions. As the directors found in that case,
see supra note 39, and as they would likely find in a case replicating the Litwin situation,
courts have substantial leeway in deciding whether or not to override the presumptions
in a director's favor that are established by the rule. A large part of the problem, of
course, is that a court can override such a presumption when it believes a director's
judgment was "unintelligent or unadvised." See id.
94 See supra text accompanying notes 47-51.
95 See id.
96 For a broad treatment of the term "good faith" as used in various contexts, see
18A WORDS AND PHRASES 83-131 (1956 & Supp. 1990). Examples of the use of the term
are collected under 84 separate headings.
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directors," and that a director cannot ignore these responsibili-
ties without being intentionally derelict. Whatever else "good
faith" may encompass, it does not include intentional dereliction.
These two concepts are quite clearly mutually exclusive. As a start-
ing point, therefore, one can say that to be in good faith, a direc-
tor necessarily must engage in conduct aimed at discharging his
or her responsibilities."
This being the case, the next step is to determine what is
required for a director's conduct to be in good faith. "Good faith"
is inherently, a subjective quality of the person acting or omitting
to act rather than an objective description of the person's act or
omission. Two points follow from this observation. First, the good
faith standard for directors' conduct must be a standard that
relates to the conduct itself rather than to the results of the con-
duct. Second, the standard must be one that is capable of being
met solely by the existence of a particular state of the director's
mind concerning the conduct.99
The parameters thus established for the good faith standard
for directors' conduct also come close to defining the standard,
because any drafter working within these parameters must nec-
essarily arrive at a formulation of the standard along these lines:
Conduct is in good faith if the director reasonably believes such
conduct is sufficiently adequate to discharge his responsibilities as
a director.
One point about which there may be contention is the re-
quirement of reasonableness of belief. It might be argued that
belief as to adequacy of conduct by itself should establish good
faith, no matter how unreasonable the belief. But it must be re-
membered that something like "pureheartedness" is an element of
good faith, and this element finds its way into the above formula-
tion of the good faith standard through the criterion of reason-
ableness, which here can be taken as a manifestation of
pureheartedness. While it is true that a completely empty-headed
director could hold any sort of belief with a pure heart, other
directors cannot be purehearted without attempting to determine
what it takes for them adequately to discharge their respdnsibili-
ties. "Reasonably believes" is used here to indicate belief i'eached
97 See, e.g., Soderquist, supra note 3, at 134243.
98 The conduct could, of course, be the act of deciding to do nothing in a given
situation.
99 This does not mean that the existence of a subjective state of mind cannot be
determined by objective manifestations.
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after making an attempt, which the director believes to be suf-
ficient, to determine what conduct is necessary to discharge his or
her responsibilities adequately. 1
00
The question of whether good faith is the proper standard
for directors' negligence liability can now be answered. In a sum-
mary of the discussion above,1"' it can be stated that the proper
standard is one that will result in liability for an arguably negli-
gent director when one or more of the following ends thereby
will be served: (1) the future behavior of directors will be chan-
neled in a desired way by holding liable a blameworthy director;
(2) the corporation or its shareholders, or some other client
group, will be recompensed for an injury attributable to conduct
for which the director is blameworthy; or (3) punishment will
accrue to a blameworthy director.
The good faith standard is an ideal standard largely because
of its clear focus on blameworthiness. Part of the standard's virtue
in this regard flows directly from its substance, its essence of
"pureheartedness." °2 Part also derives from the fact that "good
faith" is a subjective quality of persons rather than an objective
description of their acts.10 3 Also, as indicated above,"0 4 the
subjective nature of the standard mandates a focus on the con-
duct of directors-that is, on the process of their decision-mak-
ing-rather than on the results of their conduct. This focus will
guide courts away from decisions, such as that reached in Litwin,
that are based on the courts' own untrustworthy intuitions about
the substance of a director's actions, and that lead to the imposi-
tion of liability on a director who is not blameworthy.0 5
The application of the good faith standard will also channel
the future conduct of directors in desired ways. Channeling of
behavior is a practical exercise. To be effective, a legislature or
court needs to send a simple, unequivocal message. In the case of
directors, the desired message has always been, and under the
100 Actual proof of the elements of "reasonableness" would be unavoidable if a
director's conduct was not congruent with real-world norms. Otherwise, to avoid the
uncertainties inherent in ad hoc judicial examinations of subjective states of mind, courts
could apply the following presumption: Conduct will be rebuttably presumed to meet the
good faith standard if it conforms to that of the average director in analogous circum-
stances.
101 See supm text accompanying notes 53-55.
102 See supra text following note 96.
103 See supra text following note 98.
104 Id.
105 See supra text accompanying notes 58-81.
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good faith standard remains, something like this: Make a reason-
able effor* to be a good director or you will be held liable for the
damages you cause. But, until the adoption of the good faith
standard, that was not the message sent. Too often the message
was: Make good decisions or you may be held liable. The good
faith standard is clean enough, and its message is plain enough,
that finally the right message may get through to directors.

